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RACIAL JUSTICE: MORAL OR POLITICAL?*
Kendall Thomas
In the present century, black people are believed to be totally different
from whites in race and origin, yet totally equal to them with regard to
human rights. In the sixteenth century, when blacks were thought to
come from the same roots and to be of the same family as whites, it was
held... that with regards to rights blacks were by nature and Divine Will
greatly inferior to us. In both centuries, blacks have been bought and
sold and made to work in chains under the whip. Such is ethics; and such
is the extent to which moral beliefs have anything to do with actions.
-Giacomo Leopardi
INTRODUCTION
Nearly one hundred years ago, W.E.B. DuBois predicted that the
problem of the 20th century would be the problem of the color line.1 Were
he writing today, DuBois might well conclude that in the U.S., the problem
of the coming century will be the problem of the color-bind.2 Although
Americans arguably remain "the most 'race-conscious' people on earth,"3
our national conversation about "race" now stands at an impasse. Our
ways of talking, or refusing to talk, about race increasingly speak past the
racialized dilemmas of educational equity, affirmative action, poverty, wel-
fare reform, housing, lending, labor and employment discrimination, health
and medical care access, environmental justice, immigration and asylum, or
crime, policing and punishment. The current deadlock in U.S. public dis-
course on racial justice reveals itself not only to the arena of power politics;
our predicament can be seen, too, in the creeping "paralysis of perspec-
tive"4 that threatens to devitalize serious critical reflection on race and ra-
cism at the threshold of the 21st century.
Nonetheless, the broad sweep of our history and our present plight
both suggest that "racialization"5 continues to be a central fact of Ameri-
can life. Obviously, the claim that race remains a structuring principle in
U.S. institutions and social relations need in no way assume an unbroken,
unmodified continuity in the content or meanings of "racial formation in
the United States."6 DuBois' time is not our own. We can admit the com-
* Reprinted with permission from LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY, (Austin Sarat,
Bryant Garth & Robert A. Kagan, eds., 2002.)
1. W.E.B. DuBois, W.E.B. DuBois: WRITINGS 372 (1986).
2. LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION (1998).
3. MANNING MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 185 (1995).
4. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN AND THE LEG-
ACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 3 (1996).
5. For a discussion of this term see Stephen Small, The Contours of Racialization: Structures,
Representations and Resistance in the United States, in RACE, IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP: A
READER 47 (Rodolfo Torres et al. eds., 1999)
6. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990s (1994).
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plex, changing and contested character of contemporary racial formations
and still recognize that race will likely figure in U.S. law and policy for
many decades to come. Acknowledging the continuing relevance of race,
this paper asks whether the governing grammar of contemporary American
debates about the content of racial justice will be adequate for the pressing
tasks of the new century. Taking my point of reference from the ongoing
controversy over the place of "color-blindness" and "race-consciousness"
in U.S. constitutional discourse, I shall argue it is not. As I hope to show,
however, the reasons behind this state of affairs have less to do with the
concept of race than with its specific discursive deployments.
I begin with a short and selective survey of the terminological terrain
on which struggles over racial justice have been waged in American consti-
tutional law. I then describe and discuss the limits of the normative vision
that underwrites the dominant discourse on racial justice in our constitu-
tional jurisprudence. As we shall see, even in writings whose claimed con-
cerns are much broader, the normative horizons of racial justice are more
often than not drawn in and confined to moral terms. I criticize the domi-
nant debate's almost obsessive focus on the morality of race, race-con-
sciousness and racial identification, and sketch an alternative to the
language of racial moralism. This competing account finds its conceptual
center of gravity in the distinctively political dimensions of racial claims-
making. Taking an example from the contentious dispute over race, crimi-
nal law and Black civic publics, I end by indicating more precisely how a
political conception of racial justice can provide a conceptual vocabulary
for taking American constitutionalism out of its current color-bind. v
RACE AND RECOGNITION: THE "COLOR-BLINDNESS"/
"RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS" DEBATE
In the last quarter century, mainstream discussion of the forms of ra-
cial justice has increasingly come to revolve around a single normative
question. Is the use of race in public policymaking defensible in our consti-
tutional order? Broadly speaking, opinion on this issue has divided into
two main camps. On one side are those who contend that race should
never be used as a ground for imposing burdens or allocating benefits: ours
is, or should be, a "color-blind" society, whose public policy should impute
no special significance to race. On the other side are those who argue that
American constitutional norms do not categorically foreclose race-con-
scious decisionmaking. While proponents of race-consciousness may disa-
gree about the conditions under which reliance on race is legitimate, they
7. Although this exploration of the political conception of racial justice is informed by the
particular case of Americans of African descent, I do not mean to suggest that it has no applica-
tion to other publics of color. I limit my discussion to African-Americans for two reasons. First,
considerations of space will not permit the careful comparative analysis that expansion of the
argument beyond the African-American case would demand. Second, in so many salient ways,
the African-American experience has determined the structure and substance of racial formation
in the United States. As Joe Feagin has recently noted, "[n]o other racially oppressed group has
been so central to the internal economic, political, and cultural structure and evolution of Ameri-
can society- or to the often obsessively racist ideology developed by white Americans over
many generations." JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND Fu-
TURE REPARATIONS 3 (2000).
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reject the principle that race-based distinctions can never be condoned in
our constitutional order.
The textual lodestar of the color-blindness principle in U.S. Supreme
Court case law is the famous language from Justice Harlan's dissenting
opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson': "Our Constitution is color blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 9 On the current Court, this
commitment to color-blindness has found its most passionate proponents in
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In a series of increasingly
strident pronouncements on the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice Scalia has denounced the use of race as a criterion in public deci-
sionmaking, even for putatively benign purposes. Scalia would forbid even
those policies that are designed "to 'make up' for past discrimination;" con-
curring in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Justice Scalia maintained
that even putatively "benign" uses of race "reinforce and preserve for fu-
ture mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege
and race hatred."'" In the same case, Justice Thomas acidly dismissed the
notion that one could distinguish between "benign" and "malicious" uses
of race. For Thomas, there is no constitutional difference between the two:
"In each instance," he writes, race-conscious decisionmaking "is race dis-
crimination, plain and simple.""
Similar defenses of the color-blindness principle abound in the schol-
arly literature. The case for color-blindness has perhaps found its sharpest
statement in critical discussions regarding the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action. Writing over twenty-five years ago, before the Supreme Court
first squarely addressed the issue, the late Alexander Bickel argued that
the unconstitutionality of race-consciousness was axiomatic:
If the Constitution prohibits exclusion of blacks and other minorities on
racial grounds, it cannot permit the exclusion of whites on similar
grounds; for it must be the exclusion on racial grounds which offends the
Constitution, and not the particular skin color of the person excluded.' 2
For Bickel, the "lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court" and of
"contemporary history" is that "discrimination on the basis of race is ille-
gal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of demo-
cratic society."' 3 In a roughly contemporaneous intervention, Richard
Posner advanced a similar thesis. Posner maintained that the "proper con-
stitutional principle" for assessing policies that accord "preferential treat-
ment" to racial minorities is not "no 'invidious' racial or ethnic
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting).
9. T. Alexander Aleinikoff has argued that the contemporary proponents of color-blindness
have taken this sentence out of context. Aleinikoff contends that, taken as a whole, the dissent
from which this language has been wrenched is not a an attack "on the use of racial classifica-
tions, but on a social system based on an ideology of white supremacy" see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Re-reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and
Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961 (1992). I offer a fuller account of Aleinikoff's thesis infra at
25-7.
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 241.
12. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132-133 (1975).
13. Id. at 133.
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discrimination, but no use of racial or ethnic criteria to determine the dis-
tribution of government benefits and burdens.14
More recently, Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom contend in their
book, America in Black and White that "[rlace conscious policies make for
more race-consciousness; they carry society backward. We have a simple
rule of thumb: that which brings the races together is good; that which di-
vides us is bad."' 15 Although the Thernstroms concede that deep disagree-
ment exists about "which policies have what effect" 16 they leave little
doubt regarding their own views. On the Thernstroms' account, race-con-
sciousness is always and everywhere "bad": "[We] hold to Justice Harlan's
belief that 'our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens."' 17
Rejecting the demand for the immediate and categorical deracializa-
tion of public discourse, proponents of race-conscious decisionmaking ar-
gue that the only way to transcend the American racial dilemma is
precisely to take race into account. In one of the earliest constitutional
defenses of race-conscious remedies, Justice Brennan counseled caution to-
ward "[c]laims that law must be 'color-blind' or that the datum of race is no
longer relevant to public policy[.]"18 On Brennan's account, the color-
blindness principle must instead "be seen as an aspiration rather than as a
description of reality."' 9 A rule of racial non-recognition would only
"[mask] the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our
lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens."2 More
recently, Justice Stevens rejected the claim of Justices Scalia and Thomas in
Adarand that "benign" and "invidious" race-based policies must be viewed
in the same constitutional light: "There is no moral or constitutional equiv-
alence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and
one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination."21 For Stevens, the consti-
tutional consistency toward race-conscious policies demanded by the
Adarand majority would effectively "disregard the difference between a
'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat."22
In contemporary scholarly literature, the constitutional defense of
race-conscious policymaking has received extended and sophisticated elab-
oration by a number of writers. I shall concentrate here on the work of
Ronald Dworkin and Amy Gutmann, who have authored two of the most
sustained recent reflections (from either side of the debate) on the moral
case for and against color-blind constitutionalism.
Professor Dworkin announces his project in the subtitle of Freedom's
Law- he aims to defend "the moral reading of the American Constitu-
14. Richard A. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 25-26 (1974) (emphasis supplied).
15. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHEN THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 539
(1997).
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559).
18. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 327 (Brennan, J. concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 245.
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tion." As Dworkin describes it, the moral reading approaches the abstract
clauses of the U.S. Constitution "on the understanding that they invoke
moral principles about political decency and justice."23 The equality princi-
ple of the Fourteenth Amendment figures centrally in Dworkin's defense
of the moral reading. For Dworkin, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
the famous Brown case offers an exemplary instance of the moral reading.
Dworkin argues that the outcome in Brown was "plainly required by the
moral reading, because it is obvious now that official school segregation is
not consistent with equal status and equal concern for all races."24 Dwor-
kin recognizes that his proffered moral reading of the words "equal protec-
tion of the laws" goes far beyond the interpretive tenets of originalism. As
a practical matter, the men who wrote and ratified the Equal Protection
Clause aimed for much less on the ground than "equal status and equal
concern for all races": no one can doubt their commitment (or acquies-
cence) to continuing racial inequality. However, the moral reading asks
"what the framers intended to say" in writing the Fourteenth Amendment,
not "what they expected their language to do."25
In Dworkin's account, the moral method of reading the constitution
not only permits but requires reparation of the framers' earlier interpretive
error. Dworkin maintains that the Brown court properly corrected the mis-
take in understanding what led the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
to uphold race-based school segregation: "The moral reading insists that
they misunderstood the moral principle that they themselves enacted into
law."26 For Dworkin, Brown and its progeny restored racial equality juris-
prudence to its proper moral basis: the principle of equal status and equal
concern for every racial group.
Another thoughtful effort to establish the moral foundations of racialjustice is undertaken in Amy Gutmann's article, Responding to Racial In-justice.27 As its title suggests, the question Professor Gutmann poses and
seeks to answer is how we should respond to the continuing problem of
racial injustice in America. Although she takes the persistence of racial
injustice in the contemporary U.S. as a factual premise, Gutmann does not
dispute the notion that, as a normative matter, "color blindness is the ideal
morality (for an ideal society)."28 What Gutmann does deny is the claim
that color-blindness represents the fundamental principle of justice against
which any response to racial justice must be measured, even when it can be
shown that color-blind policies maintain institutional patterns of racialized
23. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 2 (1996).
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
26. Id. Although Dworkin does not affirmatively develop the argument, the moral reading
urged in Freedom's Law would appear to support the constitutionality of race-based affirmative
action. However, one must infer this from Dworkin's argument, since his discussion of affirma-
tive action focuses in the main on a critical discussion of the failure of one of its prominent critics(former Solicitor General Charles Fried) to produce a unifying moral principle that would estab-
lish the constitutional case against it. His other work suggests Dworkin would anchor the consti-
tutional defense of race-based affirmative action in moral norm of equal status and concern for
all races. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 293-315 (1985).
27. Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITCAL
MORALITY OF RACE (Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, eds., 1996).
28. Id. at 109.
discrimination. For Gutmann, the principle that should inform our re-
sponse to racial injustice is the norm of justice as fairness. Taking this prin-
ciple of justice as her regulative ideal, Gutmann contends that one can
offer a "color blind" argument in favor of "color consciousness" in public
policymaking. Gutmann undertakes to advance a "moral case against ra-
cial injustice, '"29 which recognizes the dangers of "race consciousness" with-
out discounting the claims of what she calls "color consciousness."
Gutmann endorses the social constructionist understanding that race is a
"fiction."30 As such, it ought have no "morally relevant implications for
public policy."'31 The same cannot be said for the notion of "color con-
sciousness": "If we need not be color blind, we can be color conscious. '"32
Gutmann maintains that the idea of "color consciousness" avoids the po-
tential injustice of essentialist racial categories while still recognizing "the
ways in which skin color and other superficial features of individuals ad-
versely and unfairly affect their life chances. '3 3 Taking employment, uni-
versity admissions and electoral redistricting as her examples, Gutmann
seeks to show that color conscious principles and policy are consistent with
her preferred model of justice as fairness, as well as with the ideal (which
she embraces) of a color-blind American future. Building on the moral
principle of justice as fairness, Gutmann endorses "[t]hose (and only those)
color conscious policies" that are "instrumentally valuable in overcoming
racial injustice and consistent with counting all persons, whatever their skin
color or ancestry, as civic equals."34
RACE, JUSTICE AND THE LIMITS OF MORALISM
What interests me about the dispute between the advocates of color-
blindness and the proponents of color consciousness is not so much the
language of the debate, but the normative vision that undergirds it. One of
the most fascinating aspects of the debate I've been discussing is the reli-
ance by both sides on a fundamentally moral conception of race and its
relevance for public policy. To be sure, these defenses of racial moralism
are not always fully theorized; more often than not, they are couched in the
language of moral intuition or an asserted moral consensus.35 Nonetheless,
the felt necessity to defend or attack color-blindness and color-conscious-
ness in terms of the morality of race has increasingly become one of the
more striking features of the dominant discourse.
29. Id. at 114.
30. Id. at 113.
31. Id. at 112.
32. Id. at 132.
33. Id. at 112.
34. Id. at 177.
35. Lest I be misunderstood, I should perhaps make it clear that I do not view the terms
"normative" and "moral" as synonyms for one another. As I use it here, the moral conception is
merely one form of normative argument regarding race, racism and justice; it does not exhaust
the field of normative thinking about racial justice-seeking. Indeed, my purpose in these pages is
to recommend a political alternative to the moral conception which, on my account, provides a
more precise and productive normative perspective for engaging questions of justice in our multi-
racial democracy. A thoughtful critical exploration of the distinction in another context is Jeremy
Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 597 (2000).
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In our legal doctrine, this moral idea of racial justice informs Justice
O'Connor's concern in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. with the "'per-
sonal rights' [of the Croson plaintiffs] to be treated with equal dignity and
respect" by public decisionmakers.36 Similarly, a stated fidelity to "the
moral basis of the equal protection principle"37 animates Justice Thomas'
insistence in Adarand that racial classifications always "have a destructive
impact on the individual and our society"38: "I believe that there is a 'moral
[and] constitutional equivalence' ... between laws designed to subjugate a
race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster
some current notion of equality."39
Versions of the "moralizing style" are mobilized, as well, in the theo-
retical literature on the constitution of racial justice. We have seen that for
Amy Gutmann, the morality in question has to do with the rights of indi-
vidual moral personhood. Gutmann's moral conception of racial justice
starts from the premise that "all human beings regardless of their color
should be treated as free and equal beings, worthy of the same set of basic
liberties."4 Similarly, in Ronald Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Consti-
tution, the "abstract moral principle" of racial justice to which the Equal
Protection Clause gives expression is a larger, group-sensitive recognition
of "equal status and equal concern for all races."41 Despite their differing
views about the claims of color-blindness and color-consciousness, each of
the writers I have discussed share a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a constitutional statement about the morality or immorality of discrimi-
nation. Each shares the belief that questions of racial justice under our
Constitution are properly approached from the moral point of view,4 2 and
36. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
37. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Gutmann, supra note 27, at 112-13. It bears remarking that in this respect, the moral
conception views justice as a problem of fair (racial) distribution. For criticisms of this distribu-
tive paradigm of justice see IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 15-
38 (1990); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 232 (1999).
41. DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 13. As he has made clear elsewhere, Dworkin does not un-
derstand the norms of equal status and equal concern to mean that all racial groups are entitled
to equal treatment under the law. Dworkin argues that the moral principles of equal status and
equal concern embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to "treatment as an
equal," but not to "equal treatment." see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227
(1977)
42. Readers of Professors Dworkin and Gutmann may object to my description of these two
scholars as moralists on questions of racial justice. Dworkin and Gutmann, it might be said, both
take care to highlight the fact that the moral framework that informs their conception of racial
justice is a "political" morality. See DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 2; Gutmann, supra note 27, at
107. The objection mistakes the thrust of my claims about Dworkin and Gutmann, which looks
beneath the precise language they use to uncover what I see as the basal logic that drives their
argument. While I do not deny that the chief theoretical preoccupation of these two scholars is
the public (and thus, in this limited sense, political) practice and justification of racial claims-
making, I would still want to insist that Gutmann's model of "fairness" and Dworkin's conception
of "equal status and equal concern" both rest their principle of racial justice on moral founda-
tions. Unlike the concept of "morality," Dworkin's and Gutmann's use of the term "political" is
curiously elusive, without fixed propositional content. Very little in their argument appears to
turn on its deployment; moreover, when the word is used, it has nothing at all to do with ques-
tions of power as such, and thus never goes (as it were) all the way down. Normatively, the
defense Dworkin and Gutmann offer of race-conscious policy remains an essentially moral argu-
ment. Readers who doubt my characterization of Dworkin and Gutmann should note how
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draws on the resources of racial moralism to defend their respective
positions.
In my view, this "moral constriction"43 of the public debate over racial
justice fails to capture the distinctive and constitutive role of the political
dimension of racial claims-making. At its core, the moral vision that un-
derwrites the dominant constitutional discourse on race provides a contem-
porary case study in the "displacement of politics" as we know it.44 The
moral concept of racial justice tries to capture and control the explosive,
agonistic conflicts that characterize American racial politics. If it cannot
altogether remove questions of racial power politics from its agenda, racial
moralism model can aspire to confine them within the dispassionate discur-
sive boundaries of juridical settlement, bureaucratic administration and de-
liberative legislation. If contemporary history teaches us anything about
our racial dilemma, it is that conflicts over the forms and substance of racial
injustice have been first and primarily contests about access to the means of
political power, about social relations of domination, subordination and re-
sistance. These distinctively political dimensions of race in America resist
the normative logic of the moral view that continues to predominate in
public debates about racial justice.
This is not to say that the moral conception of racial justice has suc-
ceeded entirely in excluding politics from its discursive domain. We need
only consider in this connection the terms of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Brown, which Ronald Dworkin has held up as a shining example of the
moral reading at its best. As I have noted, Dworkin interprets the Court's
judgment as a ringing repudiation of the erroneous moral principle which
had sanctioned state-imposed racial segregation in public education during
most of the previous century. For Dworkin, the Brown Court took the
Fourteenth Amendment as a textual marker for the moral precept that all
racial groups have a claim to equal status and concern within our constitu-
tional order. Dworkin's moral reading of Brown comports with the stan-
dard account of the case, which holds that the Court's chief constitutional
concern was how enforced racial segregation made Black schoolchildren
feel.4 5 Racially segregated public schools generated a "feeling of inferi-
ority" among Black students about "status in the community that may af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."46 On this
account, the heart of the harm addressed in Brown was, at base, a moral
quickly after its initial introduction "political morality" becomes simply "morality." See, e.g.,
DWORKIN, supra note 23, at 2; Gutmann, supra note 27, at 108. To my mind, this casual, unreflec-
tive semantic slippage further supports my view that the normative fulcrum on which their argu-
ments turn is moral rather than political in any complex sense.
43. I borrow this image from Jurgen Habermas' critique of the "ethical constriction of politi-
cal discourse." Jirgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND
DIFFERENCE 23 (1996).
44. BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS (1993).
45. In discussing the Brown Court's attention to "the hurt of exclusion," Kenneth Karst has
emphasized the fact that Chief Justice Warren, the author of the opinion, had regularly engaged
his former driver in conversations about the latter's life as a Black schoolchild in the South.
Quoting Warren's one-time employee, Karst reports that these talks with his driver about "how
the black man felt, how the black kid felt" were in great measure responsible for opinion's focus
on the "deep psychic harm" of racial segregation. See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 18-19 (1989).
46. Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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harm. In responding to that harm, the Court drew on the "abstract moral
principles" of the Fourteenth Amendment. I am not claiming the moral
reading of Brown has no basis in the text of the opinion. My point, rather,
is that proponents of racial moralism have not paid sufficient attention to
the fact that the Brown Court's defense of the equality principle sought
support in another, very different justification:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and lo-
cal governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.4 7
As this language suggests, the moral account of racial justice offers at
best a partial explanation of the Brown opinion. The Brown Court explic-
itly stressed the political meaning and significance of public education for
American life in the middle of the 20th Century. From this perspective, the
exclusionary practices struck down in Brown threatened the "very founda-
tion of good citizenship" in our constitutional democracy. Put another
way, the racial segregation of public schools denied African-Americans
equal access to the means of civic or political formation necessary for "per-
formance of our most basic public responsibilities." As a constitutional
matter, then, Brown can be read not only or primarily as a statement about
moral personhood and rights in a moral community; 48 on this interpreta-
tion, the decision is as much a vindication of political citizenship and right
to political society.49
To my mind, Brown is a specific, though incompletely theorized in-
stance of a broader principle of racial citizenship. The defense of that prin-
ciple derives from an openly political understanding and a political reading
of our racial Constitution. The moral conception of racial justice highlights
the immorality of discrimination, whose incidence and effects it tries to
control through ethical norms such as those that command "equal concern
and respect" or obedience to the notion of "justice as fairness." The politi-
cal conception of racial justice focuses squarely on the illegitimacy of a re-
gime of civic subjugation which the Court, in the decade after Brown,
labelled "White Supremacy."5 The moral defense of racial justice seeks to
"annihilate the political"51 dangers of race by submitting disputes about
racialized privilege and subordination to a "rational process of negotia-
tion"52 and the ethical constraints of "agreed-upon, neutral rules."53 The
moral model thus seeks to build a normative firewall between racial justice-
seeking and racial politics, toward which its basic attitude is one of anxious
47. Id. at 493.
48. It bears remarking that the Brown Court's remarks on the political functions of public
school education even before it formally states the constitutional issue to be decided; the "psychic
harms" theory on which the decision has traditionally been deemed to rest is introduced much
later in the Court's opinion.
49. For an argument along similar lines (but with a different trajectory) see Aleinikoff, supra
note 8, at 974.
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
51. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 71 (George Schwab trans., 1976).
52. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL 49 (1993).
53. Id. at 48.
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distrust. By contrast, the political account of racial justice starts from a
candid recognition that the power and persistence of racial hierarchy war-
rant a sober (and sobering) "racial realism"54 about the limits of "moral
politics." While it acknowledges the influence and achievements of the ra-
cial egalitarian ideal, the political account also insists that democracy in
America remains a racial democracy. Because American political society is
still in salient and significant ways a "racial polity,"55 a democratic concep-
tion of racial justice thus faces a double challenge. That challenge is to
review the problem of justice in light of the problem of politics, and at the
same time to "rethink the political around the axis of race."56
The moral model concerns itself with the intersection of justice and
virtue.57 The political conception directs its concerns to the bisection of
race and power. Unlike the moral conception of racial justice, the political
perspective toward racial justice-seeking refuses to deny the constitutive
value and affirmative role that power, antagonism and interest play in the
life of racialized politics. It understands that racial justice-seeking in the
late modern state takes place in a field of ongoing political conflict and
contestation, a domain in which we "cannot hope to achieve moral consen-
sus" 58 on questions of race. The political model thus attends to the agonis-
tic dimensions of racial justice-seeking. Its normative account of justice
and racial politics places full accent and emphasis on the power relations
that subtend disputes and decisionmaking about the distribution of burdens
and benefits across racial publics. For the political conception of racial jus-
tice, the effort to translate the deep agreements of racial politics into the
depoliticized language of rational morality cannot possibly achieve what we
hope from it. The attempted moral mastery of racial politics does not
make its "conflicts, antagonisms, relations of power, forms of subordination
and repression simply disappear. '' 9 The political conception of racial jus-
tice recognizes that because "[m]oral discourse is a personal dialogue, 60 its
decision rules embody a model of judgment that simply fails to wrestle with
the large public questions of group privilege, inequality and power that an
adequate account of race, racism and racial justice-seeking must engage.
I hope by now to have said enough to convey a sense of the normative
boundaries that inform a properly political conception of racial justice. I
turn now to a brief description of what I take to be the rudiments of its
basic structure. In broad terms, the political conception of racial justice is a
species of "democratic justice."' 61 A state committed to democratic justice
in the "racial polity" must undertake at least three key tasks; the perform-
ance of which determines its political legitimacy. The first task is to secure
54. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
55. Charles W. Mills, The Racial Polity, in RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 13, 17 (Susan E. Bab-
bitt & Sue Campbell, eds., 1999).
56. Id.
57. For an extended normative defense of this connection see ONORA O'NEILL, TOWARDS
JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A PRACTICAL ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL REASONING (1996).
58. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 234 (1981).
59. See MOUFEE, supra note 52, at 49.
60. See HANNAH PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 216 (1972).
61. My understanding of this concept draws heavily on the work of Ian Shapiro. See IAN
SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999).
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and maintain equal and meaningful access to vulnerable racial publics to
the processes of self-governance through which democratic political identi-
ties are formed and given expression. I have in mind here such formal
rights as the right to vote and run for elective office. The second task of
constitutional democracy is to ensure that the voices and interests of vul-
nerable racial publics are not excluded from state institutions in which
binding collective choices are discussed and made. For the political con-
ception of democratic justice requires that the representation rights of vul-
nerable racial publics must not simply be given formal voice; they must be
accorded real weight and value. From this perspective, legal and policy
outcomes matter. This is not to say that vulnerable racial publics would
necessarily win each and every dispute over the content of race-relevant
law and policy. What the right of racial representation would require is an
understanding that the process and product of state policymaking cannot
claim political legitimacy if the governing decision rules entrench racially
segmented hierarchy and racialized democratic domination.
The third element of a political conception of racial justice is perhaps
more controversial. A democratic understanding of racial justice-seeking
would demand an ongoing effort to facilitate what Jane Mansbridge has
called "enclaves of resistance"62 within vulnerable racial publics, a pro-
tected space for developing oppositional ideas about racial justice and its
opposite. Mansbridge rightly argues that since "no democracy ever reaches
the point at which justice is simply done, democracies need to recognize
and foster enclaves of resistance."63 Nancy Fraser aptly terms these venues
for oppositional discussion and deliberation "subaltern counterpublics."64
The goals of these counterpublics include understanding themselves bet-
ter, forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the memories of past injus-
tices, interpreting and reinterpreting the meanings of those injustices,
working out alternative conceptions of self, of community, of justice, and
of universality, trying to make sense of both the privileges they wield and
the oppressions they face, understanding the strategic configurations for
and against their desired ends, deciding what alliances to make both emo-
tionally and strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and deciding
how to act, individually and collectively.65
Like the relations of power they challenge, these subaltern counterpublics
emerge and flourish beyond the formal boundaries of statist politics.
Nonetheless, they play a decisive role in both validating and contesting the
claim of the state to democratic legitimacy.
Ian Shapiro has identified at least four levels on which institutional-
ized oppositional counterpublics are a "defining criterion of democracy. '"66
First, because periodic transfers of power are a necessary, if not sufficient
condition of democratic governance, oppositional political enclaves pro-
vide a site for potential alternative leaderships to organize and equip them-
62. Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFER-
ENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 46, 58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
63. Id.
64. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 4 (Bruce
Robbins ed., 1993).
65. See Mansbridge, supra note 63, at 58.
66. SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 234.
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selves to assume the reigns of democratic state power.67 Second,
oppositional counterpublics help legitimate democratic politics by "at-
tracting social dissent toward antigovernment forces within the regime
rather than directing it at the regime's foundations. ' 68 In this way, anger
and alienation among civic counterpublics .can be directed at particular
power holders without resort to oppositional strategies that permanently or
fundamentally threaten the broader culture of democratic politics. Third,
institutionalized opposition advances the wider public interest by ensuring
that there will always be members of the political society who stand ready
to "ask awkward questions, shine light in dark corners, and expose abuses
of power. '69 Fourth and finally, the presence of effective oppositional
counterpublics creates a space within democratic political culture which
gives subordinated groups some reason to believe that they are not
doomed to suffocate under the weight of inherited injustices, and "can
challenge prevailing norms and rules with the realistic hope of altering
them. 70
Taken together, these elements of a political conception of racial jus-
tice create the conditions for polity in which democratic citizenship and
racial citizenship are mutually constitutive and mutually transformative, in
ways that might be positive for both.71 I recognize that the conception of
racial justice I have sketched here will be a source of deep political discom-
fort, particularly in its suggestion that vulnerable racial publics should be
accorded a species of democratic "destabilization rights."7" In theory (if
not in actual practice), the modern American constitutional order is pre-
mised on the notion that democratic politics and racial politics are hostile
at all points. The conception of racial justice-seeking elaborated here col-
lides fundamentally with a vision of American political identity and Ameri-
can political ideas whose sheer taken-for-grantedness has made it almost
impossible to question, much less dislodge. Nonetheless, I am persuaded
that the political conception of racial justice I am defending is both a valid
and viable alternative to the magical thinking that characterizes the regnant
status quo. Abandoning the idea that we can or must achieve a moral con-
sensus for adjudicating disputes about race and power, the political concep-
tion proceeds from the belief that "there is no criterion for justice that is
67. Id.
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. In this regard, I disagree with Charles Mills' implicit assertion that "racial polity" in the
U.S. must always and only be a "white supremacist polity." See Charles Mills, The Racial Polity,
in RACISM AND PHILOSOPHY 17, 31 (1999). That the two ideas have been closely identified in
American political life ought not obscure the fact that these connections are historical, not inher-
ent. As such, they are subject to change. Although it may be difficult for us to imagine such a
future, a democratization of the relations among this country's diverse racial publics might well
create the conditions for transforming the inherited meanings of race, and forging a political
society in which racial difference need not be or become a technology of racial domination. For a
thoughtful defense of a democratic politics of difference see Cheryl Kerchis and Iris M. Young,
Social Movements and the Politics of Difference, in MULTICULTURALISM FROM THE MARGINS:
NON-DOMINANT VOICES ON DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY 47-48 (1995); See also Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of 'Our Constitution is Color-Blind', in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THm KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 273 (K. Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
72. ROBERTO UNGER, POLITICS: THE CENTRAL TEXTS 387-91 (1997).
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anterior to what democracy generates. '7 3 The political conception of racial
justice thus enjoins us to look for democratic solutions to the problems of
racialized hierarchy, privilege and disadvantage in the domain of democ-
racy itself. One possible point of entry here is by way of the concept of
democratic racial citizenship, and its normative commitment to the right of
vulnerable racial publics "to survive and participate"74 fully in the institu-
tions of American constitutional democracy.
TAKING RACIAL CITIZENSHIP SERIOUSLY
I have said that the political conception of justice asks us to take the
idea of democratic, race-conscious citizenship seriously. However, any ef-
fort to place the idea of citizenship at the center of political and legal dis-
course on race must acknowledge a threshold difficulty. For most of its
history, American political culture has treated the concept of citizenship
with indifference, if not outright contempt. This has been particularly true
with respect to questions of racial justice. A 1973 article by the late Alex-
ander Bickel illustrates my point. In Citizenship in the American Constitu-
tion, Bickel deployed his formidable analytic and rhetorical skills in order
to show that "the concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role in
the American constitutional scheme. ' 75 For Bickel, this is part of the ge-
nius of our constitutional democracy. Bickel begins by noting that "the
original constitution presented the edifying picture of a government that
bestowed rights on people and persons, and held itself out as bound by
certain standards of conduct in its relation with people and persons, not
with some legal construct called citizen. '"76 Bickel then turns his attention
to the language of citizenship in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Re-
construction Amendments. Bickel concedes that these two texts repre-
sented the first attempt in our constitutional history at "an authoritative
definition of citizenship in American law."'77 On his account, however,
these codifications of citizenship rights sought only to dispel Chief Justice
Taney's mischievous linkage of rights and citizenship status in the Dred
Scott case, whose constitutional vision had been repudiated with the Union
victory in the Civil War.
In addition to his argument from the constitutional text, Bickel draws
more broadly on normative political philosophy:
Emphasis on citizenship as the tie that binds the individual to government
and as the source of his rights leads to metaphysical thinking about polit-
ics and law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking, to a search for
reciprocity and symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and obli-
gations, rationally ranged one next and against the other. Such thinking
bodes ill for the endurance of free, flexible, responsive and stable institu-
tions, and of a balance between order and liberty .... It is gratifying,
73. SHAPIRO, supra note 40, at 237-38.
74. SHAPIRO, supra note 62, at 236.
75. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 369
(1973).
76. Id. at 370.
77. Id. at 372.
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therefore, that we live under a Constitution to which the concept of citi-
zenship matters very little indeed.78
Having surveyed the claims of citizenship theory in American constitu-
tional practice, Bickel concludes that "[c]itizenship is at best a simple idea
for a simple government. 7
9
In the decade after Bickel celebrated its irrelevance for American con-
stitutional law, the citizenship idea would become an object of renewed
interest in normative political and legal theory. In law schools, scholars
such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman explored the implications of
the revival of civic republican thought for American constitutionalism.
However, the call for the rehabilitation of the republican tradition met with
some resistance among scholars of race and constitutional law. In a critical
reply to Sunstein and Michelman, Derrick Bell and Preeta Bansal urge
"skepticism" as "the necessary response" for people of color toward the
urged revival of republican ideas of citizenship.80 Bell and Bansal argued
that the civic republican faith "in the existence of shared values and the
possibility of the common good" assumes "that a social consensus will
emerge from 'reasoned' deliberation by individuals who think 'rationally'
and who are capable of abstracting from their private experiences."'" In
their view, "blacks have served as the group whose experiences and private
needs have been suppressed in order to promote the 'common good' of
whites."82 Accordingly, Bell and Bansal found little in the republican vi-
sion of citizenship that spoke to the dynamics of American racial politics.
"What parts of the republican vision," they queried, "are capable of com-
bating and subduing the by-now familiar priorities for whites in racial poli-
cymaking, priorities that have preserved for whites their perpetual
power?"83
The question Bell and Bansal raise here about the political use and
abuse of the citizenship idea warrants an answer. Briefly stated, I believe
that the beginnings of a response to their concerns can be found in the
work of scholars who have rethought and reconstructed the narrative of
republican citizenship in order to put it to new uses within a vision of mul-
ticultural justice and a democratic politics of difference. Theorists such as
Iris Marion Young84 have persuasively argued that there is no necessary
conceptual conception between the idea of citizenship and the ideology of
classical republicanism. The concept of citizenship, Professor Young con-
tends, can serve as a crucial tool in building a democratic political concep-
tion of racial justice for our contemporary multicultural polity. Properly
understood, the citizenship idea places the very questions of racialized
power relations that concern Bell and Pransal at the center of its normative
concerns. In this respect, the language of citizenship can provide a gram-
mar for racial claimsmaking that speaks directly to our own moment, when
78. Id. at 387.
79. Id.
80. Preeta Bansal & Derrick Bell, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J.
1609-22 (1988).
81. Id. at 1610.
82. Id. at 1611.
83. Id. at 1613.
84. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
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it is not so much the moral personhood or status but the political identity
and station of racial minority publics whose future is in doubt.85
It should be noted in this connection that the citizenship idea figures
prominently in those provisions of our Constitution around which so much
of the U.S. debate over racial justice has revolved. As T. Alexander
Aleinikoff has demonstrated, the concept of citizenship was a crucial ele-
ment in the architecture of the Reconstruction Amendments, whose terms
continue to inform the project of racial claims-making in contemporary
American political culture. In a careful contrarian reading of the dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson"6 , Professor Aleinikoff argues that the ideal of color-
blindness was not the primary source the first Justice Harlan's constitu-
tional objections to the segregation statute upheld by the Plessy majority.
Harlan's target was not "racial classifications" but the "ideology of white
supremacy."87 Moreover, the Plessy dissent must be read as "a discourse
on the fundamental rights of citizenship, not the equal protection of the
laws."88 Harlan "painted a far grander picture than equal treatment; [he],
in effect, portrayed the recent amendments as declaiming that the blessings
of citizenship are to be respected in every jurisdiction of the United
States."89 For Aleinikoff, the Plessy dissent offers a "unifying account of
the Civil War Amendments" as a whole. "[T]he 'freedom' guaranteed by
the Thirteenth Amendment is linked to the fundamental-rights-protecting
'liberty' of the Fourteenth Amendment; the opposite of the slavery prohib-
ited by the Thirteenth Amendment is the citizenship guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."9 Although he does not explicitly frame his ar-
gument in these terms, Aleinikoff makes a compelling case for a normative
reorientation from a moral to a political reading of the Reconstruction
Amendments, and of the vision of justice as political freedom to which they
give expression.9' In this respect, Aleinikoff's reinterpretation of the Plessy
85. Although I can only remark it here, one important historical example of the use of the
citizenship idea to constitute a Black civic public can be found in the Montgomery bus boycott.
The Montgomery boycott is widely regarded as an inaugural moment in the consolidation of the
modern African-American civil rights movement. Most accounts of the event (and the move-
ment as a whole) have emphasized the moral language in which the boycott's leaders defended
the campaign. However, in a famous speech at the Holt Street Baptist Church during the early
days of the boycott, it was a political conception of African-American citizenship to which Martin
Luther King, Jr. appealed as the predicate ground of the assault on Montgomery's segregated bus
system. King began his speech by noting that the boycott was anchored "first and foremost" in
the fact that "we are American citizens - and we are determined to apply our citizenship- to
the fullest of its means." See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS 1954-1963, 138-39 (1988). Needless to say, in calling attention to the role the language of
citizenship played in the Black civil rights movement, I do not mean to minimize the importance
of moral language in mobilizing African-Americans and their allies in the struggle against de jure
segregation. For an account of how the civil rights movement staged "the conflict over segrega-
tion as a moral drama," see ROBERT WEIBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 234 (1995).
86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87. Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 961.
88. Id. at 964.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 974.
91. Aleinikoff's stated project is to argue the thesis that "liberty" rather than "equality" is
the central value defended in Harlan's dissent and, more fundamentally, in the Reconstruction
Amendments as a whole. Id. at 963-64.
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dissent as a judicial defense of the "freedom of citizens"92 and the "bless-
ings of citizenship" 93offers an insightful constitutional genealogy of the po-
litical conception of racial justice urged here.
The problem, as Aleinikoff himself admits, is that Harlan's idea of the
"personal liberty of citizens" is too elusive a concept to do the work that a
political conception of racial justice would demand of it: "simply invoking
'liberty' is not enough." 94 The challenge, then, is to specify precisely what
an adequate grundnorm for a political conception of racial justice would
look like. Taking my example from the vexed debate over racial disparities
in the criminal law, I want to suggest that the "political freedom of vulnera-
ble racial publics" might generate a useful normative framework for think-
ing about claims of racial injustice in the current conjuncture.
RACE, CRIME AND POLITICAL JUSTICE:
AN ANALYTIC EXPLORATION
In recent years, Black conservative and neoliberal scholars have chal-
lenged the claim that racially disparate effects in the system of American
criminal justice should be viewed as a problem of unlawful racial discrimi-
nation. To take one example, in his recent book, Race, Crime, and the Law,
Randall Kennedy contends that we ought not conclude that racial dispari-
ties in criminal law are racist without first determining whether the law
hurts or harms Black communities. Thus Professor Kennedy asks, is "the
black population hurt when traffickers in crack cocaine suffer longer prison
sentences than those who deal in powdered cocaine or helped by incarcer-
ating for longer periods those who use and sell a drug that has had an
especially devastating effect on African-American communities?"95 In ef-
fect, Kennedy applies a utilitarian moral theory to determine when and
how racial disparities in criminal law might raise a problem from the per-
spective of the antidiscrimination principle. In short, Kennedy endorses an
essentially moral conception of racial justice.
The moral calculus that underwrites Kennedy's analysis of racially dis-
parate treatment within the criminal justice system revolves around his
twin notions of "racial reputation" and the "politics of respectability". For
Kennedy, the "historically besmirched reputation"96 of African-Americans
is one of the central reasons behind the nation's "indifference to their
plight."97 Kennedy writes:
In American political culture, the reputation of groups, be they religious
denominations, labor unions, or racial groups, matters greatly. For the
reason alone, those dedicated to advancing the interests of African-
Americans ought to urge them to conduct themselves in a fashion that,
92. Plessy, 137 U.S. at 557.
93. Aleinikoff, supra note 8, at 964.
94. Aleinikoff concedes earlier that "liberty is a capacious term open to any number of inter-
pretations that support very different kinds of civil rights policies." Id. at 976.
95. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 10 (1998). Similarly, Kennedy won-
ders whether Black communities are "hurt by prosecutions of pregnant women for using illicit
drugs harmful to their unborn babies or helped by interventions which may at least plausibly
deter conduct that will put black children at risk?"
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 21.
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without sacrificing rights or dignity, elicits respect and sympathy rather
than fear and anger from colleagues of other races.98
Kennedy argues that Black Americans must make a renewed commitment
to the "politics of respectability" 99:
The principle tenet of the politics of respectability is that, freed of crip-
pling, invidious discriminations, blacks are capable of meeting the estab-
lished moral standards of white middle-class Americans. Proponents of
the politics of respectability exhort blacks to accept and meet these stan-
dards, even while they are being discriminated against wrongly (in hypo-
critical violation of these standards). They maintain that while some
blacks succeed even in the teeth of discouraging racial oppression, many
more would succeed in the absence of racial restrictions. Insistence that
blacks are worthy of respect is the central belief animating the politics of
respectability. One of its strategies is to distance as many blacks as far as
possible from negative stereotypes used to justify racial discrimination
against all Negroes. 1°
°
Building on these two moral tenets, Kennedy goes on to examine such
policies as the racially disparate effect of federal sentencing guidelines for
crack cocaine and powder cocaine possession. 0 1 The governing statute im-
poses much harsher prison terms on crack cocaine offenders than it does
on those convicted of powder cocaine offenses. The sentencing disparity is
100:1 for crack and powder cocaine violations, respectively. For Kennedy,
this "dramatic difference"' 2 in the prison sentences imposed for crack and
powder cocaine-related crime does not necessarily run afoul of the antidis-
crimination principle embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.
In defending this assertion, Kennedy offers a number of arguments
against the "racial critique" of the crack-powder disparity. Most pertinent
to our purpose, however, are those Kennedy develops in response to the
claim (made by federal district court Judge Clyde Cahill) that the enhanced
punishment of crack offenders imposes "an increased burden on blacks as a
class."' 3 Kennedy questions the grounds on which this assumption rests.
98. Id.
99. Kennedy borrows this term from Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham. See EVELYN HIGGIN-
BOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BAPTIST CHURCH,
1880-1920 (1993). It bears remarking that for Professor Kennedy, the "politics of respectability"
is a normative ideal. By contrast, Professor Higginbotham uses the concept critically, and as an
interpretive construct for understanding the history of the women's movement in the Black Bap-
tist Church in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
100. Strangely, Kennedy never tells us what it is that makes his urged campaign to garner
racial respectability "political," even in the narrow sense of formal engagement with the state.
Indeed, an interest in the state is nowhere to be found in his account of the "politics" of respecta-
bility. In this respect, Kennedy's proposal is the academic version of the spirit that animated the
Million Man March. Indeed, Kennedy describes the text of the pledge prepared for that gather-
ing as an model effort to "uplift the racial reputation of African-American men." see Kennedy,
supra note 96, at 18. For an historical account and critique of the "racial uplift" ideology Ken-
nedy endorses, see Kevin Gaines, UPLIF THE RACE: BLACK LEADERSHIP, POLITICS AND CUL-
TURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1996).
101. Kennedy notes that nationally, 92.6 percent of those sentenced for federal crack cocaine-
related offenses in 1992 were African-American; a mere 4.7 percent of convicted crack cocaine
offenders were white. By contrast, that same year, 45.2 percent of defendants convicted under
the federal laws punishing powder cocaine-related crimes were white; 20.7 percent of those sen-
tenced were African-American. See KENNEDY, supra note 96, at 364-65.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Id. at 375.
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It might be that the longer incarceration of Black crack offenders confers
benefits on the largely African-American communities from which they are
sent to prison. Imprisonment, in short, is both a burden and a benefit,
writes Kennedy; "a benefit for those imprisoned and a good for those
whose lives are bettered by the confinement of criminals who might other-
wise prey on them."'" Kennedy also challenges the notion that the crack-
powder sentencing differential imposes a racially discriminatory burden.
He notes that the challenged statute subjects anyone who violates its crack
cocaine provisions without regard to their race. Kennedy argues that Judge
Cahill apparently believes that "black crack convicts represent blacks as a
whole. They do not."105 On Kennedy's analysis, the crack cocaine differ-
ential would only be racially discriminatory if it fell on the entire Black
population, as opposed to those "bad Negroes"1 °6 who actually break the
law.1" 7 Since it does not, it cannot properly be called racist, not least be-
cause it "could be"1' that the enhanced sentencing of Black crack addicts
and dealers "helps" the vast majority of "good" African-Americans, who
not only gain "security [as] law-abiding Blacks vis-A-vis criminals," but
share the enhanced "reputation of blacks as a collectivity in the eyes of
whites."'109
Kennedy is careful to note that he is not endorsing the sentencing dis-
tinction between crack and powder cocaine. The differential, he concedes,
may well be a policy mistake. His is a rather different claim, which answers
the charge that the sentencing differential is racist. Kennedy concludes
that "even if these policies are misguided, being mistaken is different from
being racist, and the difference is one that greatly matters."'10 Curiously,
Kennedy's concluding remarks fail to highlight a second, crucial legal dif-
ference between "mistaken" and "racist" drug policies: under current Su-
preme Court doctrine, the latter are clearly unconstitutional, while the
former are not. Despite its racially disparate effects, a successful claim that
the crack-powder sentencing distinction was "racist" in constitutional terms
would have to prove that it had been adopted intentionally in order to im-
prison Black convicts for a longer term than whites.111
The case Kennedy chooses to illustrate that point is the Supreme
Court's decision in Hunter v. Underwood.11 In Underwood, a unanimous
Court voided a provision of the Alabama state constitution that disen-
franchised any person who was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude.
The Court found that when it was enacted in 1901, the provision was aimed
at removing Black Alabamians from the state's voting rolls. Kennedy
writes approvingly of the decision, and argues that the Supreme Court was
104. Id.
105. Id. at 375-76.
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id. at 376.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 386.
111. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Kennedy has elsewhere offered
a more extended defense of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Randall Ken-
nedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1994).
112. 421 U.S. 222 (1985).
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right to strike down Alabama's law, because "unjustified racial considera-
tions" '113 had driven its initial adoption. Kennedy contends that little evi-
dence exists to support a similar conclusion with respect to the crack-
cocaine sentencing differential; it may be fairly inferred that he accordingly
believes the distinction is constitutional, notwithstanding its differential ra-
cial impact.
However, it is not Kennedy's account and endorsement of the purpose
requirement that makes his discussion of Underwood so intriguing in the
instant context. I am rather more interested in the way Kennedy's preoc-
cupation with the moral economy of racial reputation and respectability
blinds him to a problem which lies right on the surface of the Underwood
case. That problem has to do the political economy of racially disparate
sentencing. Let me explain what I mean.
In the decade the Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Under-
wood, American society has witnessed an explosion in prison incarceration.
From 1980 to 1994, the population of the U.S. grew by 9.8 percent.114 Dur-
ing the same period, the number of men and women in jail or prison in-
creased an astronomical 195.6 percent." 5 Much of the growth in America's
imprisoned population during these years was a result of the so-called "war
on drugs." The number of drug offenders incarcerated for drug offenses in
federal prisons increased nearly tenfold from 1980 to 1993 (accounting for
almost three-quarters of the overall increase in federal prisoners.1 16 The
number of state prisoners incarcerated for drug offenses during the men-
tioned period grew at a similar rate. 7
The most striking aspect of this burgeoning incarceration rate is its
racial cast. In 1992, the U.S. Public Health Service reported that 76 percent
of the nation's self-reported illicit drug users were white, 14 percent were
Black, and 8 percent were Hispanic." 8 Although the percentage of each
group that used illegal drugs roughly corresponded to their presence in the
general population, the incarceration rates tell an altogether different
story. Between 1986 and 1991, the number of white drug offenders in state
prisons increased by 110 percent, but the number of Black drug offenders
rose by 465 percent." 9 African-Americans constitute 74 percent of those
who are serving time for drug related crimes. 2 ° If our current rates of
incarceration remain stable, 28.5 percent of African-American men will do
jail or prison time at least once during their lifetime. 12' A disproportionate
number of these men will be casualties of the "war on drugs." As that war
113. KENNEDY, supra note 96, at 376.
114. ANNE GOLENPAUL, INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 829 (1997).
115. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM 148 (1999).
116. Id. at 145.
117. Id.
118. JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 81 (1996).
119. MARK MAUER, INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: STATE RACIAL DISPARI-
TIES IN IMPRISONMENT 10 (1997).
120. MARK MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 12 (1995).
121. MARK MAUER & JAMIE FELLNER, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISEN-
FRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (1998).
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has been prosecuted, the crack-powder cocaine sentencing differential has
effectively drawn a color line between the white crack cocaine-using major-
ity and the Black offenders who make up the majority of Americans im-
prisoned for crack related crimes.
In passing judgment on the racial demographics of drug-related incar-
ceration, as stated above, Kennedy would pose the following moral ques-
tion: Do the longer prison sentences meted out to African-Americans who
sell and use powder cocaine help or hurt the nation's Black population? In
Kennedy's moral conception of racial justice, this assessment would depend
in significant measure on whether racially disparate prison terms for Black
crack offenders enhance the racial reputation of law-abiding African-
Americans in the eyes of whites. If the crack-powder cocaine sentencing
differential in fact has led white middle-class Americans to believe that
Blacks have the capacity to "meet the established moral standards" to
which they themselves subscribe, Kennedy would presumably conclude
that the differential does not present a case of racial injustice, at least in the
absence of evidence that it was intended to punish Black drug crack offend-
ers more harshly than their white powder-using counterparts.
My main concern here is not to stake out a substantive position in the
debate over the crack cocaine-powder cocaine sentencing differential; I
want, instead, to contest Professor Kennedy's view of the normative terms
on which that debate should proceed. As a normative matter, the political
conception of racial justice advanced in this essay would approach the
problem from another direction. The political model is not indifferent to
the relative costs and benefits of racially disparate drug sentencing laws: it
shares that much with the analysis offered in Race, Crime and the Law.
Aside from this, however, Kennedy's racial moralism and the political ac-
count of racial justice could not be more divergent. The political concep-
tion of racial justice would undertake a very different normative accounting
of the costs and benefits that racially disparate sentencing entails. The cen-
tral task of the political conception of racial justice is not to determine how
the disparate sentencing regime affects the racial reputation and standing
of Black "communities". Rather, it seeks to assess the impact of these laws
on the political power of Black civic publics.
The political conception of racial justice would thus pose a number of
questions which Kennedy's argument from racial moralism fails to ask,
much less answer: Do these sentencing differentials increase or diminish
African-American access to the means and modes of collective political ac-
tion? Does the longer incarceration of Blacks who are convicted of these
crimes strengthen or weaken the political integrity and effectiveness of Af-
rican-American civic publics? Do such laws enhance or undermine the in-
stitutions and practices through which Black political identity and opinion
are shaped and mobilized? What are the burdens and benefits of these
policies in sustaining the social and cultural conditions of African-Ameri-
can citizenship?
In exploring these questions, one of the first issues on which the politi-
cal conception of racial justice would focus is the impact on Black civic
publics of America's felony disenfranchisement laws. A recent study of the
subject commissioned by The Sentencing Commission and Human Rights
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Watch is instructive in this regard. The authors report that nearly four mil-
lion Americans cannot vote because of felony convictions. 122 1.4 million of
the total number consists of Black men. 123 Viewed on a state-by-state ba-
sis, the picture is even more grim. Thirty-one percent of the Black men
who live in Alabama and Florida are permanently disenfranchised.124 In
Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia and Wyoming, one in four Black
men are permanently excluded from the vote.125 In Washington State, one
in four Black men are currently or permanently disenfranchised. 126 In Del-
aware and Texas a full twenty percent of Black male citizens are either
permanently or currently barred from the franchise.1 27 In four other states,
16-18 percent of voting age Black men are currently disenfranchised. 128 In
nine of the states, the figure stands at 10 to 15 percent.1 29 The authors
estimate that if current incarceration rates remain stable, 28.5 percent of
Black men will do prison time at least once in their lifetime (a figure which
is six times greater than that for white men). 3 ' Since felony disen-
franchisement policies apply as well to defendants who are convicted but
not sentenced to prison, the report predicts that among the next generation
of Black American men, some 40 percent of them will probably lose the
right to vote for life. 3
These facts should give us pause. 132 The story they tell is only in part
about the current and future evisceration of the Black vote. I don't mean
to suggest that when nearly a third of the Black men who live in some
states are barred from the franchise, we ought not be concerned about the
122. Id. at 13.
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131. Id. The report offers comparably dire projections for Black women. In the ten years
from 1985 to 1995, the rate of female incarceration rose by 182 percent (as compared to an in-
crease of 103 percent for men). Because Black women are sentenced to jail and prison at a rate
eight times higher than that of their white counterparts, the effects of increased incarceration on
Black women are obviously magnified among them. Id.
132. One objection to the line of argument advanced here would deny that there are any
relevant connections between the powder cocaine-crack cocaine sentencing differential, on the
one hand, and felony disenfranchisement laws, on the other. The factual premise of the objection
is that the predicate of felony disenfranchisement laws is conviction, not length of imprisonment.
However, this premise holds true only for jurisdictions that bar ex-felons from voting for life.
The sentencing differential is far from irrelevant in states whose disenfranchisement laws are time
bound. Equalization of the prison terms for crack- and powder-cocaine would shorten the period
during which offenders of color would be excluded from the franchise. Moreover, we should not
underestimate the impact of the felon disenfranchisement regime on voting and vote-eligible
members of racial civic publics, on whom it is not unreasonable to believe these laws have a
dispiriting effect, contributing as they do to what I would call the "political disorganization" of
the oppositional counterpublics from which these offenders come, and to which the majority re-
turn. For a thoughtful critical accounts of how the drug law enforcement contributes to the"social
disorganization" of Black and Latino communities see Tracey Meares, Social Disorganization and
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effects of their exclusion on Black electoral power as a whole.1 33 However,
more is at stake here than formal access to the ballot box.'3 4 As I see it, for
African Americans, franchise rights have never been purely or primarily
instrumental. Those rights are also, and perhaps more fundamentally, con-
stitutive of Black political culture in positive and affirmative ways. The his-
tory of Black civic publics in the U.S. suggests that participation in formal,
electoral "politics" has enabled African-Americans to contest and redraw
the very boundaries of what the dominant discourse has defined as "politi-
cal."' 35 Specifically, the African-American struggle for (and exercise of)
voting rights have been important experiential building blocks for the con-
struction of an alternative, oppositional Black public sphere. The existence
of a Black "subaltern counterpublic" 136 has made it possible for this subor-
dinated social group to create "parallel discursive arenas" and "invent and
circulate counterdiscourses" which challenge the dominant discourse on
race, and empower African-Americans to "formulate oppositional inter-
pretations of their identities, interests and needs."' 37 Over time, the partic-
ipation of African-Americans in this counterpublic sphere has given rise to
a civic activist consciousness whose emergence has produced "a devastating
critique of American political institutions and values as well as suggestions
about theoretical and institutional alternatives."' 38 Black American en-
gagement in mainstream "franchise politics" has been indispensable in cre-
ating a subaltern site and a subaltern set of institutions for facilitating
deliberation and discussion of a whole range of subjects that racialized
stratification would otherwise shield from interrogation and
contestation.139
In this post-civil rights era, some have doubted whether a Black public
sphere can even be said to exist in contemporary America. 140 Although
the news of its death may be premature, the impact of ex-felon disen-
franchisement laws on the political life of the Black civic sphere should
command the concern of democratic constitutionalists. As my colleague
George Fletcher has noted, the basic question "is whether categorical di-
vestment of voting rights introduces an impermissible element of caste into
133. Indeed, our concern should be heightened when the higher percentage of Black ex-felons
provides a pretext for surreptitiously purging duly registered African-American voters from voter
registration rolls, as occurred in Florida during the last presidential election. See Bob Herbert,
Young Black Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2000, at A39.
134. This of course is not to say that the effects of ex-felon disenfranchisement may not pose
serious problems under contemporary voting rights jurisprudence. A discussion of these
problems can be found in Alice Harvey, Comment: Ex-Felon Disenfrancisement and its Influence
on the Black Vote, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145-89 (1994).
135. For a discussion of the distinction between "politics" (la politique) and the "political" (le
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(Bruce Robbins ed., 1993).
137. Id. at 81.
138. Michael C. Dawson, A Black Counterpublic?: Economic Earthquakes, Racial Agenda(s),
and Black Politics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 195, 201 (1994).
139. Steven Gregory, Race, Identity and Political Activism: The Shifting Contours of the Afri-
can American Public Sphere, 15 PUB. CULTURE 147, 159 (1994).
140. See Dawson, supra note 136, at 197.
244 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
the American political system, ' 141 in which African-Americans increasingly
constitute a discrete class of "abjected citizens. ' 142 I have sought to show
that for African-American citizens, meaningful action in that system not
only involves engagement in traditional, franchise-based politics; it also in-
cludes participation in the subaltern enclaves of oppositional discourse that
permit members of the Black public sphere to define and understand politi-
cal issues, test political options and organize effective political intervention.
Felony disenfranchisement regimes quite literally block increasing numbers
of African-Americans from access to a political institution which has been
crucial in creating and sustaining Black civic activism and consciousness.
From this perspective, we may rightly ask whether the vulnerable racial
publics to which these men and women belong can persist in the face of
their prolonged, sometimes permanent exclusion from the voting booth.143
Even if they do, there is sufficient reason to believe that the comparative
strength and status of the Black political sphere will be compromised for
many decades to come. Again, what is at stake here is not a moral, but a
political issue.
I have argued here for a political conception of racial justice which
seeks a greater democratization of the power relations among racial publics
in this country. Specifically, this democratic vision of racial justice defends
the right of vulnerable racial publics to full and effective political participa-
tion in the institutions of American democracy. Further, it robustly sup-
ports and promotes the coalescence of organized enclaves of opposition
that empower subaltern racial publics to criticize and contest the reigning
understandings and practices of democracy. Can a constitutional democ-
racy that takes these commitments seriously permit felony disenfranchise-
ment to become a permanent part of its basic political structure or
practices?
One might insist, with Randall Kennedy and others, that absent evi-
dence of biased decisionmaking, the disparate racial impact of these laws
raises no problem under our current constitutional regime. This objection,
however, misses the point. The critical position advanced here stands on a
political norm of legitimacy, not the narrower norm of constitutionality. To
take this normative shift and ask the properly political question about these
laws is to answer it: viewed through a normative lens of political legitimacy,
felony disenfranchisement laws are unjust because they deprive the Afri-
can-American civic public of full and free access to one of the minimum
conditions of collective democratic action. Moreover, this state of affairs
141. George F. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of
Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999).
142. Jamie Daniel, Rituals of Disqualification: Competing Publics and Public Housing in Con-
temporary Chicago" in MASSES, CLASSES AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 68 (M. Hill & W. Montag
eds., 2000).
143. This is not to suggest that African-American convict-citizens have not created their own
venues for political education and critical opinion formation within U.S. jails and prisons. They
have done so, however, against enormous odds, and often in the face of systematic opposition by
politicians and brutal repression by penal officials. It may well be that the repeal of felony disen-
franchisement laws would enhance the prospects for more fully integrating Black prisoners' de-
veloping critical perspective on race and the politics of incarceration into the deliberative
discourses of the broader Black public sphere.
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harms "blacks as a collectivity. 14 4 On my account, the regime of voting
rights divestment adversely affects the political possibilities of all African-
Americans, 14 including those "good" Negro citizens who meet "the estab-
lished moral standards of white middle-class Americans" '146 and, as a for-
mal matter, retain the right to vote.
A political analysis of the connections among the crack cocaine-power
cocaine sentencing differential, felony disenfranchisement laws and the
structural debilitation of the Black public sphere thus reveals the limits of
racial moralism. In the final instance, racial moralism produces too narrow
a vision of racial injustice and its remediation. The "politics" (such as it is)
of "racial reputation" cannot possibly achieve the justice its advocates so
desperately want from it: recognition of the equal moral personhood of
Black Americans provides no protection against the harm of unequal polit-
ical citizenship. 47 As Leopardi once aptly put it, "[s]uch is ethics; and
144. KENNEDY, supra note 96, at 376.
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such is the extent to which moral beliefs have anything to do with
actions. 148
CONCLUSION
For much of the last century, the debate between the proponents of
color-blindess and the defenders of race-consciousness has stood at the
center of American public discourse on the question of racial justice. My
effort in these pages has been to show that the underlying normative
framework of this debate- what I have called racial moralism- may have
run its term of service. Whatever one may think about its value in decades
past, the language of racial moralism offers too limited a grammar for ad-
dressing the challenges of our racial future. Contesting this constricted
moral vision, I have advanced a political understanding of racial justice,
whose conceptual resources more fully comport with the realities of racial-
ized hierarchy and subordination in our own time.
More than a few readers may dispute the conception of race and racial
politics defended here, not only in its particulars, but in its enabling prem-
ises. To them I can only say that I do not take such challenges as a threat to
the political conception of racial justice-seeking. To the contrary, they are
themselves a potential instance of the democratic politics I would endorse.
A properly political vision of racial justice not only requires, but invites its
own contestation. Finally, since the substance of the political conception of
racial justice-seeking can only emerge in and through the actual practices
of democracy, this essay has not attempted a detailed map of its institu-
tional architecture. Rather, and more modestly, my purpose here has been
to explore and defend a few elements of its basic design. In doing so, I
hope to have shown how the twin notions of racial citizenship and racial
civic publics might be used as a compass for steering our national conversa-
tion on race, politics and justice beyond the boundaries of racial moralism,
toward the more open frontier of multiracial democracy.
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